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1. Introduction 
 
Central bank transparency is usually studied in a game framework focusing on the 
interactions between the monetary authority and the private sector. Departing from this approach, 
several studies introduce monetary and fiscal interactions. Assuming that the government (leader) 
and the central bank play a Stackelberg game, Ciccarone et al. (2007), and Hefeker and Zimmer 
(2010) have shown that uncertainty (or opacity) about the central bank’s “political” preference 
parameter could have a fiscal disciplining effect, leading to lower inflation and higher output gap. 
It could also reduce the macroeconomic volatility if the initial degree of opacity is sufficiently 
high. We remark that such effect is somewhat present but not underlined in Hughes Hallett and 
Viegi (2003) who consider a Nash game between fiscal and monetary authorities, both concerned 
with taxes. In opposite to the two other studies, the latter considers that uncertainty is only 
associated with the weight attached to the output gap. This might induce arbitrary economic 
effects of central bank preference uncertainty (Beetsma and Jensen, 2003). In effect, a small 
change in the uncertainty specification (e.g., putting the stochastic parameter in the front of one 
of the two arguments of the central bank’s objective function) can lead to radically different 
effects. 
In this paper, we reconsider the issue of fiscal disciplining effect in a Nash equilibrium using 
a framework similar to Ciccarone et al. (2007) and Hefeker and Zimmer (2010), with uncertainty 
affecting both weights allotted to the output and inflation stabilization. The objective of the paper 
is to show how a change in the game structure could affect the importance of fiscal disciplining 
effect of central bank opacity.  
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The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model. 
Section 3 presents the Stackelberg equilibrium. Section 4 examines the effect of central bank 
opacity in the Nash equilibrium. The last section summarizes our findings. 
 
2. The model  
 
We consider a representative competitive firm which chooses labor to maximize profits by taking 
as given the prices (or the inflation rate  ), the wages (and so expected inflation e ) and tax rate 
( ) on the firm’s revenue, subject to a production technology. The normalized supply function 
incorporating the effects of distortionary taxes is: 
  ex ,        (1) 
where x  (in log terms) represents the output gap.  
The fiscal authority is concerned with the stabilization of inflation and output gap fluctuations 
around a zero target and the stabilization of public expenditures g  (expressed as a percentage of 
the output) around a target g . Its loss function is 
])([E 22
22
12
1 ggxLG   ,      (2) 
where E  is an operator of mathematical expectations, 1  and 2  are the weights assigned to the 
stabilization of inflation and public expenditures respectively. The weight assigned to the output-
gap stabilization is unity. The public expenditures are composed of public sector consumption, 
i.e. public sector wages, current public spending on goods and other government spending. They 
are assumed to yield immediate utility to the government and have no incidence on the output 
supply. The government minimizes (2) subject to the budget constraint excluding seigniorage 
revenue and public debt:
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g .          (3) 
Retaining the control of fiscal instruments, the government delegates the conduct of monetary 
policy to the central bank. The latter sets its policy to minimize the loss function 
])1()[(E 222
1 xLCB   , 0 ,     (4)     
where   is the expected relative weight that the central bank assigns to the inflation stabilization 
and it could be different from 1 . Larger (small) values of   signify that the central bank is 
relatively conservative (liberal or populist) in the sense of Rogoff (1985).  
The central bank does not make full disclosure about the weights assigned to the inflation and 
output-gap stabilization, meaning that   is a stochastic variable for the government and the 
private sector. The distribution of   is characterized by 0)(   , 22)()var(    and 
],1[   . A higher variance 2  represents a higher degree of central bank political opacity. 
The case where the central bank is completely predictable and hence completely transparent is 
represented by 02  . Given that 0)(    and ],1[   , 
2
  has an upper bound so that 
],0[2    (Ciccarone et al., 2007). 
 
3. The Stackelberg equilibrium  
 
The timing of the game is the following. First, the private sector forms expectations, e , then 
the government sets fiscal policy,  , and lastly the central bank makes monetary policy decision, 
 . The private sector composed of atomistic agents plays a Nash game against the central bank. 
The government plays against the central bank as a Stackelberg leader. 
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 The game is solved backwards. The minimization of (4) subject to (1) leads to the central 
bank’s reaction function:  
  

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



1
))(1( e
.        (5) 
The budget constraint (3) implies that the government has only one free instrument to choose 
between   and g . Assume that the government uses   as policy instrument and sets it to 
minimize (3), subject to (1) and (5). This leads, given that 2
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the government’s reaction function: 
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Substituting   given by (6) into (5) and imposing rational expectations yield: 
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Using (1), (3) and (5)-(7), we solve for  , x ,   and g , and the variance of   and x  at the 
Stackelberg equilibrium denoted by an upper index “s”: 
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The denominator of (8)-(11) increases with 2 , the numerator of (8)-(10) is invariant with 
2
  
while the numerator of (11) increases with 2 . Thus, an increase in 
2
  reduces 
S , S  and Sg , 
leading to higher Sx  (lower output distortions) since 0)(   . In effect, output distortions due 
to taxes destined to finance public expenditures imply higher expected and current inflation, and 
lower output gap. The government perceives that marginal costs associated with higher taxes are 
higher when the central bank is more opaque. Brainard’s (1967) conservatism principle will 
guide the government to adopt a less aggressive fiscal policy (“disciplining effect”). This stance 
of fiscal policy leads to lower inflation and higher output gap at the cost of larger deviation of 
public expenditures from their target. 
Opacity triggers two opposing effects on macroeconomic volatility. The fiscal disciplining 
effect can more than counterbalance the direct effect of opacity on the variability of inflation and 
output gap if the initial degree of opacity is sufficiently high, i.e. 
1
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versa (see Hefeker and Zimmer (2010)). The fiscal disciplining effect is more likely to induce a 
decrease in the macroeconomic volatility if the central bank is less averse to inflation (i.e., 
smaller  ) and the government is less concerned with the public expenditures deviations (i.e., 
smaller 2 ). In mathematical terms, given the upper bound on 
2
  (i.e.,  
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the latter conditions are reversed, the direct effect of opacity will always dominate the fiscal 
disciplining effect.  
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4. The Nash equilibrium 
 
The previous findings are based on the Stackelberg game between fiscal and monetary 
authorities. Such a game is justified if the government sets its fiscal policy once at the beginning 
of a period and the central bank makes monetary policy decisions during the period. However, 
important monetary and fiscal policy decisions could also occur simultaneously. Allowing the 
fiscal and monetary authorities to move simultaneously in a Nash game, we can examine how a 
modification in the timing of the strategic game could affect the effects of opacity. 
The timing of the game is the following. First, the private sector forms e , then 
simultaneously, the government sets   and the central bank chooses  . The private sector still 
plays a Nash game against the central bank. The government and the central bank play a Nash 
game against each other.  
The game is solved by backward induction. Rational private sector will realize that the final 
outcomes will emerge from a solution which combines the optimal reaction functions of both 
fiscal and monetary authorities and the expected inflation rate that these reaction functions imply.  
Minimizing (4) subject to (1) leads to the central bank’s reaction function which is the same 
as (5). Taking e  and   as given, the government minimizes (2) subject to (1) and (3) and hence 
behaves according to the reaction function 
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Solving (5) and (12) for   and   in terms of e  and g  yields 
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Imposing rational expectations by taking mathematical expectations of (13), we obtain: 
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Using (1) and (12)-(14) yields the Nash equilibrium solutions denoted by an upper index “N”: 
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where the second-order Taylor approximation is used to obtain (18). Deriving (15)-(18) with 
respect to 2  gives  
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Higher opacity induces higher N  and lower Nx  (higher output distortions). It affects 
positively N  if 0)1(1 2   . The latter is verified if the weight attributed to the public 
expenditure target is low enough (small 2 ), the central bank is sufficiently populist (smal  ) 
and/or the preference  choc   quite large. If 0)1(1 2   , the fiscal disciplining effect is 
present in the Nash equilibrium and induces a lower N , while being unable to more than 
counterbalance the direct effect of opacity on N  and Nx .  
 
We remark that in (15)-(18, when )1( 2  tends to zero, 
N , Nx  and N  could tend to   
and   while )var( N  and )var( Nx  approach  . Under full transparency, we have 
0)1( 2    and 0
N . Higher opacity leads to higher N , with the latter approaching   
when 2  increases in the way that  0)1( 2 . Then, a slight increase in 
2
  could turn 
N  
from   to  . The predictions of the model just before and after that the )1( 2  changes 
sign are implausible and this could be explained by that the Taylor approximation works only 
with small deviations. To avoid that, we impose 0)1( 2   , i.e. )1(
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Since )var( N  and )var( Nx  are approximated around 0 , the condition for the existence of 
fiscal disciplining effect is therefore 0)1(1 2   , implying that )1(
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1
  
Therefore, contrary to the Stackelberg equilibrium, the fiscal disciplining effect can never 
more than counterbalance the direct effect of opacity on the volatility of inflation and output gap. 
                                                 
1
 We have 
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2
 according to Cicarone et al. (2007). 
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The above findings could be explained by the absence of any commitment made by the 
government in the Nash game. Its non-cooperative behaviour will lead the central bank to doubt 
if opacity has any fiscal disciplining effect in terms of reducing the public expenditures and taxes. 
Thus, the government will not have incentive to restrict as less as possible public expenditures 
and taxes. In other words, Brainard’s (1967) conservatism principle which implies that the 
government is incited to adopt a less aggressive fiscal policy under central bank opacity is not 
likely to play an important role in guiding the government’s actions in the Nash equilibrium even 
though the perceived marginal costs associated with higher taxes are higher. Therefore, as the 
fiscal disciplining effect is inexistent or very weak, the direct effect of opacity will dominate.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we have shown that the fiscal disciplining effect of central bank opacity, which 
manifests in the framework where the government and the central bank act respectively as 
Stackelberg leader and follower, could disappear or become very weak when these two 
authorities play a Nash game. In the Nash equilibrium, an increase in the degree of central bank 
opacity will always induce higher inflation rate and higher output distortions, with a higher 
macroeconomic volatility. It would increase the volatility of inflation and output gap even in the 
case where the fiscal disciplining effect is present. These results are independent of the initial 
degree of central bank opacity, in opposite to the Stackelberg equilibrium.   
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